From China to Turkey: The Uighurs in a Position of a New Asia’s Rising Force in the Global Jihad by Wolf, Siegfried O.
 ——— 
1 Shamil, Shams (2017, January 6). Istanbul attack: Why China's Uighurs are joining global jihadist 
groups. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/istanbul-attack-why-chinas-uighurs-
are-joining-global-jihadist-groups/a-3703552
2 Grierson, Jamie (2017, January 3). Isis claims Istanbul nightclub attack as perpetrator remains at 
large. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/isis-group-
claims-responsibility-for-istanbul-nightclub-attack
3 The New York Times (2017, January 5). Wave of Terror Attacks in Turkey Continue at a Steady 
Pace. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/28/world/middleeast/turkey-terror-
attacks-bombings.html 
South Asia Democratic 
Forum (SADF)





+12 026 834 180
+32 2 808 42 08
Reg. Num. BE 
833606320 
From China to Turkey: 
The Uighurs in a Position of a New Asia’s 
Rising Force in the Global Jihad
FOCUS
SADF FOCUS 
12/01/2016 No. 27 
ISSN 2406-5633 SADF
Siegfried O.Wolf 
Keywords: Uighurs, China, Turkey, Istanbul Attack, Syria, Terrorism, 
Global Jihad, Islamic State, al-Qaeda
Abstract
On New Year’s Eve, Istanbul had to witness another major terrorist 
incident. The gunman who attacked a popular night club in the 
Turkish Metropole and murdered 39 people and severely injured 
many more, most likely belonged to the Uighurs, a Muslim 
community residing in China (1). This became evident for the Turkish 
authorities, especially after they arrested numerous suspicious 
Uighurs in the aftermath of the bloody assault. Being a NATO 
member and a significant partner in the US-led coalition fighting ISIS 
(particularly in Syria), Turkey is getting increasingly identified by 
international terrorists who represent the main target in their Global 
Jihad (2). As such, the experience with terrorist attacks at the 
Bosporus is nothing new (3). Moreover, this can also be seen in more 
than 30 violent acts against Turkish state and society during the last 
year. Plus, the fact that the Islamic State (IS) is claiming 
 	 2 
responsibility for the New Year’s onslaught is reckoned.4 However, the allegation that the 
New Year’s attack in Istanbul was carried out by Uighurs5 is surprising and marks a new 
phenomenon in international terrorism. Having said this, the ‘Uighur assault’ during the New 
Years’ celebrations raises several questions. Firstly, why are the Uighurs getting involved in 
terror attacks outside China and especially in Turkey? Secondly, why is the Islamic State 
claiming responsibility for the attack and what is the connection between the Uighurs and IS? 
Thirdly, are Uighur jihadists capable of launching major terror attacks like the one in Istanbul, 




The Uighurs in China: A community between perceived repression and responding 
militancy 
The Uighurs refer to a distinct and mostly Sunni Muslim ethnic community which is residing 
in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR)6 and represent one of the 55 
country’s recognized ethnic minorities. However, they often feel suppressed by the Chinese 
central government and view Beijing as a ‘colonising power’7 attempting to undermine their 
cultural identity, political rights, religion and to exploit (‘their’) region rich in natural 
resources. This is gaining significance since the Uighurs identify themselves as original 
inhabitants of Xinjiang, which they describe as ‘East Turkistan.’8 Similarly, many of the 
Eastern-Turkic speaking Uighurs (what makes them feel linked to Central Asia even more 
closely) favour separation from China or at least opt for greater autonomy. It is not surprising 
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Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/isis-group-claims-responsibility-for-
istanbul-nightclub-attack	
5 Grierson, Jamie (2017, January 4). Istanbul nightclub gunman identified, says Turkish foreign minister. The 
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that this tension will most likely cause a sharp reaction by Chinese security circles that aim to 
have Xinjiang under their tight control, both for economic and geostrategic reasons. 
Furthermore, constituting one-sixth of the China’s territory, Xinjiang is perceived as an 
integral part of the modern Chinese nation state.9 Hence, the Chinese government have 
already struck down several separatist intensions in the respective province. This led to an 
increasing militancy among extremist elements within the Uighur community, which in turn 
further radicalized. The situation is becoming even more complex due to the fact that the 
Uighur separatism is not only an ethnic-nationalist movement but has a religious dimension, 
too. More recently, they have claimed that the Muslims in Xinjiang felt oppressed by the 
central and regional authorities represented by the dominant Han Chinese majority10 in terms 
of practicing their Muslim culture, traditions, and religion.11 This has laid the foundations for 
Islamists capitalizing the course for ‘East Turkmenistan’ for their ‘Global Jihad’. By 
observing an increased intermingling of international Jihadist networks with Uighur militants 
aiming at the separation of Xinjiang from China,12 Beijing has subsequently enforced its 
regulations even harsher; raised its budget for internal security dedicated to Xinjiang; and 
intensified activities to fight terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.13 Consequently, 
tensions between Uighurs and Han Chinese majority were dramatically growing and, among 
other clashes, violent riots broke out between both groups in July 2009 which resulted in at 
least 197 fatalities, hundreds of injuries, and extensive damage of buildings and infrastructure 
in Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR.14 Another wave of violence happened in 2012. 
Experiencing a deadly rioting vicious cycle of unrest and retribution, many of the Uighurs 
fled from China and migrated (legally or illegally) to other countries. Not all of them joint the 
																																								 																				
9 Pantucci, Raffaello and Edward Schwarck (2014), Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – 
The Expansion of Uighur Extremism?, CIDOB Policy Research Project, Barcelona Centre for International 
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13 Radio Free Asia (2016, June 29). Uyghur Attackers Came From 'Religious Family'. Retrieved from: 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/family-06292015153300.html	
14 Numbers are based on official Chinese resources;  
Yan Hao, Geng Ruibin and Yuan Ye (2009, July 18). Xinjiang riot hits regional anti-terror nerve.  
Retrieved from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/18/content_11727782.htm	
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militant resistance against the Chinese state, but the increasing numbers are alarming not only 
for Beijing but also for the international community. 
	
The Turkey-Uighur puzzle: From affection to alienation 
Apparently, the emergence of such grievances between Turkey and the Uighurs is a new trend 
these days. Traditional Turkish people and Uighurs share some ethnic features and have not 
only religious but also cultural bonds.15 Therefore, it seemed that there is much interests at the 
Bosporus for the plight of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Here, religious radicalized and ultra-
nationalist conservative elements among Turkish society (like the neo-fascist organisation 
Grew Wolves or the rising nationalist civil society organization Turanci Movement 
Platform/Turancı Hareket Platformu) showed remarkable understanding and sympathies for 
the resistance of their Islamic fellow believers against the alleged repressive state policies of 
Beijing (e.g., ban of religious practices like worship and fasting during the Muslim holy 
month of Ramadan16). Latter phenomenon founds its expression in a tremendous growth of 
the anti-Chinese sentiments and protests in Turkey during the recent years, like burning of 
Chinese flags, organising attacks on Chinese restaurants, harassment of tourists, and the 
violent agitations against the consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Istanbul and the 
Chinese embassy in Ankara in the Summer of 2015.17 In this context, it is important to note 
that these anti-Chinese agitations got not only enforced by radical Islamist press and state 
media but also instrumentalised by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his search for support 
from conservative political powers in order to maintain its grip over the country and society, 
especially in view of the last general elections in 2015.  
 
However, by witnessing ‘open sympathies’ for Chinese Muslims and some exchange of 
diplomatic blows between Ankara and Beijing,18 many observers got the impression of 
friendly Turkish-Uighur ties. But in fact, the relationship turned sour for several reasons. 
																																								 																				
15 Girit, Selin (2015, July 9). China-Turkey relationship strained over Uighurs. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33440998	
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18 Dorsey, James M. (2015, July 15). Anti-Chinese Protests in Turkey: Relations with China Under Test. RSIS 
Commentary. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
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Firstly, the Uighurs had to realize that the anti-Chinese protests were inspired by domestic 
power political dynamics, rather than by seeking ‘revenge’ and justice for the Uighurs. In 
contrast, instead of experiencing substantial support, at least from state authorities and major 
civil society organizations, the Uighurs had to face indifference towards their own cause. 
Increasing racism and discrimination against Asian people including the Turkish Uighurs 
strengthened the feeling of neglect and led to further alienation of the Uighurs from the 
Turkish state and its people. Secondly, besides the fact that the ‘Uighur issue’ got highjacked 
for political partisan interests by R. T. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
for the last electoral campaign to win over conservative and right-wing votes, the recent shifts 
in Ankara’s foreign policy seems to determine an important factor too. Against this backdrop, 
besides Turkey’s own intricated and nebulous military involvement in Syria, the latest 
rapprochement with Russia was not well taken by some Islamist hardliners, identifying 
Moscow with the genocide in Aleppo, the mass killings of Muslims,	 and numerous other 
crimes against humanity. In this context, especially Moscow’s increasing involvement in 
Afghanistan and Central Asian states and the emerging Sino-Russia security cooperation in 
counter-terrorism in the region, has repercussion for Turkey too. As such, Erdogan’s Moscow 
policy is perceived as anti-Uighur. Thirdly, Turkey’s slacking economy is in need for more 
impetus. In order to address this problem, President Erdogan is pivoting towards Asia in 
general and China in particular.19 More concretely, he wants Turkey to become a new partner 
of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, a multi-billion dollar investment project 
financed by China to improve industrialization, and connectivity between Asia and Europe.20 
As such, Uighur militants are identifying Turkey as part of the ‘Chinese Orbit’. By fighting 
China not only within its own borders but also targeting Chinese economic and geopolitical 
interests abroad, Turkey is increasingly moving in the focus of the Uighur separatists and 




19 Singh, Michael (2016, October 24). Is Turkey Pivoting to China? PolicyWatch 2715. The Washington 
Institute, Washington D.C. Retrieved from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/is-turkey-
pivoting-to-china	
20 Ze, Shi (2015), A look at a new concept and the remarkable practice of China’s development through the “One 
Belt, One Road”, Presentation at the International Conference of the Schiller Institute, Paris, France, 13-14 June 
2015. Retrieved from: http://newparadigm.schillerinstitute.com/media/pr-shi-ze-regard-sur-le-concept-nouveau-
d-une-ceinture-une-route/	
 	 6 
The Uighurs and the global Jihadist movement 
In the early stages, Islamic State and al-Qaeda did not seem to engage much with the Uighurs 
and showed only little interest in the situation regarding Chinese Muslims. However, this has 
changed during the last decades. It is important to note, that the active international terror 
organizations such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda in particular, declared Jihad against China 
by condemning Beijing for bad handling of its Uighur minority.21 Both groups worship the 
fight against the Chinese as their ‘Islamic responsibility’ describes them as an ‘enemy of all 
Muslims.’22 This classic Sunni-Jihadist propaganda on the persecution of Muslims was also 
adapted in the Uighurs’ rhetoric. This is evident in various videos and materials, in which 
Uighurs call for global Jihad and uprisings in China.23 Obviously, such situation created 
‘Uighur terrorist inroads,’ first into Syria and now into Turkey.  
 
However, due to searching for a shelter in Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially during the 
Taliban regime, Uighurs got increasingly in contact with the global jihadist movement, 
especially with al-Qaeda. In addition, Uighur militants got not only trained and equipped, but 
also ideologically indoctrinated with the notion of ‘Global Jihad’. During the last years, this 
situation turned even more difficult for the Uighurs in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region due to  
the Chinese pressure on Pakistan. Through various military campaigns organised by Pakistani 
Army like Zarb-e-Azb, the Uighurs were forced to close their camps in the country and move 
into Syria.  
 
In Syria, many Uighurs joined the Al-Nusra Front (previous branch of al-Qaeda still 
supported by its ‘mother organisation’), which was allied with the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), today also known as Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), one of the major 
umbrella groups of the Uighur fighters. However, there are also reports that the Uighurs can 
be found among other Syrian war parties, especially within Islamic State. It seems that 
																																								 																				




22 Saud Mehsud and Maria Golovnina (2014, March 14). From his Pakistan hideout, Uighur leader vows revenge 
on China. Reuters. Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-pakistan-uighurs-
idUSBREA2D0PF20140314	
23 Pantucci, Raffaello and Edward Schwarck (2014), Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – 
The Expansion of Uighur Extremism?, CIDOB Policy Research Project, Barcelona Centre for International 
Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://www.cidob.org/ca/publicacions/series_de_publicacio/stap_rp/policy_research_papers/transition_in_afghan
istan_filling_the_security_vacuum_the_expansion_of_uighur_extremism	
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Islamic State and Al-Nusra Front are even competing with each other in recruiting new 
Uighurs. Moreover, there are also reports that the Uighurs are fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq. 
At the moment, it seems that many of the Uighur fighters are joining Jihad in Syria or Iraq 
from economic reasons, rather than because of the ideological notions or traditional links with 
certain groups like Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. In this context, it is reported that the  
Uighur fighters in general are ‘popular’ among IS recruiters. Being geographically, 
demographically, and socioeconomically diverse in terms of force composition, IS seems to 
be attracted to Uighurs very much. In general, many Uighurs are poorer and older, and often 
accompanied by their families. As such, joining Jihad in Syria or Iraq means a necessary 
geographical relocation because of their forced migration from China. Subsequently, many 
Uighurs are not a ‘seasoned fighters’ (like many Taliban mercenaries in Afghanistan), but 
only looking for a longterm engagement. Despite the fact that some Uighurs do not have 
appropriate experience, they are still attractive for IS, since they are known for being less 
involved in sectarian tensions. Plus, it would weaken the coherence of IS forces. Lastly, due 
to the situation that the Uighurs cannot turn their backs to China or to other neighboring 
countries without facing tremendous challenges, they are becoming remarkably dependent on 
the war parties in Syria.  
 
Final thoughts: The Uighurs as a new international terrorist threat 
At this stage, any assessment of militant Uighurs and their organizational structures (ETIM 
operating particularly outside China) regarding their strength, size, scope and capacities is 
difficult. A recent Reuters report has placed the figures at around 400 in Pakistan and 250 in 
Afghanistan.24 The Global Times stated the approximate number of 300 Chinese nationals 
(meaning the Uighurs) fighting for Islamic State.25 These numbers are not verified and thus  
many questions appear not only regarding the exact size of the Uighur terrorist network, but 
also how dangerous it can become.26 However, even if the number of the Uighur militants 
																																								 																				
24 Mehsud, Saud and Maria Golovnina (2014, March 14). From his Pakistan hideout, Uighur leader vows 
revenge on China. Reuters. 
Retrieved from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/us-pakistan-uighurs-idUSBREA2D0PF20140314	
25 Yongzheng, Qiu (2012, December 15). Turkey’s ambiguous policies help terrorists join IS jihadist group: 
analyst. The Global Times.  
Retrieved from: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/896765.shtml	
26 Ghosh, Palash (2005, December 31). China Prods Pakistan To Crack Down On Uighur Separatist Militants. 
International Business Time. 
Retrieved from: http://www.ibtimes.com/china-prods-pakistan-crack-down-uighur-separatist-militants-701001;  
Tiezzi, Shannon (2015, January 15). China's Uyghurs and Islamic State. The Diplomat. Retrieved from: 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-uyghurs-and-islamic-state/	
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seemed to be relatively marginal and kept a relatively low profile, they would start to 
constitute an increasing, severe threat. In regard to some new reports, the lack of members 
and material resources got compensated by logistic, financial and personal support from 
globally acting Jihadist networks. The Uighurs got not only integrated in their existent 
international terror structures and actions, but also extended their radius of operations. The 
Uighur fighters fought alongside al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan during the US-
led Operation Enduring Freedom and offered support in fighting against NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Moreover, the Uighurs also gained 
combat experience in Chechnya and were involved in several terrorist activities in 
Kyrgyzstan, for example in plotting the attack on the U.S. Embassy in 2002 or the Chinese 
Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2016.27 Having this in mind, the Uighur militants are also 
alleged to be involved in the deadly 2015 bombing of Bangkok’s Erawan Shrine, a popular 
tourist side, especially among Chinese visitors.28  
 
In recent years, from within Afghanistan, they have got massively recruited for the war in 
Syria. Latest surveys are claiming that the number of the Uighur fighters in Syria are running 
in high hundreds. 29  Other sources are claiming even couple of thousands. 30  These 
engagements at the ‘global battlefields of Jihad’ determines a critical juncture for the Uighur 
militants in regard to the strategy and methods. In order to gain a broader support base for 
their fight against China, they not only attacked Chinese facilities abroad, but also joined 
terror groups outside their own region. In this context, they acquired more technical skills and 
switched to the use of more sophisticated weapons.31 Obviously, the internationally operating 
Uighur terrorists gained additional strength and efficiency due to the growing numbers of 
refugees building up vast transnational networks. These networks are gaining importance, 
especially since they have got deeply entranced into the new, growing terrorist-crime nexus as 
																																								 																				
27 Phillips, Tom (2016, August 30). Suicide bomber attacks Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/bomb-attack-chinese-embassy-kyrgyzstan-
bishkek	
28 BBC (2015, August 17). Bangkok bomb: Deadly blast rocks Thailand capital. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33963280	
29 Pantucci, Raffaello (2016, September 1). Now China, too, is in Isil's firing line. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/01/now-china-too-is-in-isils-firing-line/	
30 Ali, Mohanad Hage (2016, March 2). China’s proxy war in Syria: Revealing the role of Uighur fighters. 
Alarabiya. Retrieved from: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2016/03/02/China-s-proxy-war-
in-Syria-Revealing-the-role-of-Uighur-fighters-.html	
31 Initially, their preferred weapons were knifes. 	
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petty criminals and terrorists.32 The latter case is characterised by a phenomenon that 
appeared in Europe several times (i.e., the attackers from Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Berlin). In 
view of the high number of fake Turkish passports providing Uighur terrorists the opportunity 
to travel,33 it could be seen as an indication for the Uighurs’ linkages with criminal networks. 
Taking everything into account, large community of the Uighur militants, the experiences 
with how to conduct Jihadist activities from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and from others 
places, as well as various skills provided by criminal networks or activities, the Uighurs are 
now able to carry out major terror attacks in Turkey. In consequence, the international 
community must recognize the plight of the Uighurs not only as a humanitarian and 




32 See for the increasing significance of the Crime-Terror Nexus in detail: Basra, Rajan, Peter R. Neumann, and 
Claudia Brunner (2016). Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. 




33 BBC (2015, January 14). China 'breaks Turkish-Uighur passport plot'. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30810439	
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